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Institutions, Infrastructure, and Trade
ABSTRACT : We work with a panel of bilateral trade, exploring the influence of infras-
tructure and institutional quality on patterns of trade with a Poisson estimator, extended
with the Baier and Berstrand method for multilateral resistance and accounting for firm
heterogeneity and selection. Trade depends on institutional quality and exporter and im-
porter access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure. While we
emphasize exports of developing countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in
the South also limits market access for exports from the North. The pattern of results
implies that policy emphasis on developing country market access while not providing
enough support for trade facilitation, may be misplaced.
Keywords: export underperformance, trade, institutions, infrastructure, zero-trade
JEL categories : O19, F10, F15
1 Introduction
While ”globalizers,” as defined by Dollar and Kraay (2004), appear to be catching up with
the OECD, the countries that are not are instead falling further behind in both trade
and income terms. Indeed, many developing countries are consistent under-performers in
trade. This begs the obvious question ”why?” In part, the pattern of export performance
is linked to the political economy of policy reform, to institutional development, colonial
history, development assistance, and the general North-South dialog.
Given relatively low participation by lower-income countries in the world economy,
negotiators within the World Trade Organization have been given a ”leave no country
behind” mandate focused on integration of developing countries into the trading system.
More broadly, in terms of development assistance linked to trade emphasis has been placed
on North-South tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs). A shift of focus toward policy
determinants of market access for developing countries, in a world of limited development
resources, implies shifting those same resources away from other priority issues, like local
institutional development and improvements to physical infrastructure. Yet the evidence
suggests that physical and institutional conditions at home are basic determinants of
effective market access abroad.
Recent literature focusing on trade (largely based on gravity models) supports the
view that better institutions can foster trade. Levchenko (2004) argues that differences
in institutional quality can themselves be a source of comparative advantage, finding that
institutional differences across countries are important determinants of trade patterns.
Using a gravity model, Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) find that bilateral trade volumes
are positively influenced by the trading countries’ institutional quality. Ranjay and Lee
(2003) look at a particular aspect of institutions, the enforcement of contracts, and its
impact on the volume of international trade. They construct a theoretical model to
show how imperfect enforcement of contracts can reduce the volume of trade in goods for
which quality issues are important. Using a gravity equation that incorporates proxies
for the enforcement of contracts, they find that measures of contract enforcement affect
the volume of trade in both differentiated and homogeneous goods. However, the impact
is larger for differentiated goods. Also employing a gravity model, Depken and Sonora
(2005) estimate the effects of economic freedom on U.S. consumer exports and imports for
the years 1999 and 2000. They find that better institutional quality of the partner country
has a positive effect on the amount of exports from the U.S. to that country. Helbe et al
(2007) look at the impact of institutional transparency on trade of countries in the Asia-
Pacific Region. They find that higher transparency of the trading environment through
greater predictability and simplification of regulations has an important impact on trade
costs. Groot et al (2004) also find that institutional quality and the quality of governance
has a significant, positive and substantial impact on bilateral trade flows. Nunn (2007)
analyses whether countries with better contract enforcement export relatively more in
industries for which relationship-specific investments are important. The paper finds
that contract enforcement explains more of the global pattern of trade than countries’
endowments of capital and skilled labor combined. Democratic institutions have also been
shown to have positive effects on trade. For example, Yu (2010) estimates an augmented
gravity model with a measure of democracy based on a theoretical framework, and finding
that democratization significantly increases trade, potentially contributing by 3-4 percent
overall to bilateral trade growth.
The literature also offers evidence on infrastructure and its impact on trade. Lima˜o
and Venables (2001) show that infrastructure is quantitatively important in determining
total transport costs. They estimate that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of
predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked coun-
tries. Using a gravity model, Bougheas et al (1999) also provide evidence from European
countries linking infrastructure to transport costs and hence trade. Wilson et al (2005)
have quantified the effects of trade facilitation by considering four aspects of trade facili-
tation effort: ports, customs, regulations, and e-business (which is a proxy for the service
sectors of telecommunications and financial intermediation, which are key for all types of
trade). The authors find that the scope and benefit of unilateral trade facilitation reforms
are very large and that the gains fall disproportionately on exports. Brun et al (2005) also
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highlight the importance of the quality of physical infrastructure for trade. Using separate
infrastructure measures (measuring the quality of rail, roads, telecommunications, ports
and airports) Nordas and Piermartini (2004) find that all measures are important with
ports having the biggest impact on trade. Focusing on logistics, Behar et al (2009) find
that a one standard deviation improvement in logistics could increase exports by approxi-
mately 46 percent for an average-size developing country. Focusing on Africa, Iwanow and
Kirkpatrick (2007) construct aggregated indicators of trade facilitation and infrastructure
and find a positive impact of the indicators on exports, while Portugal-Perez and Wilson
(2012) examine the impact of so-called soft and hard infrastructure on the export perfor-
mance of developing countries. Their results suggest that trade facilitation measures have
a positive impact on export performance.
In this paper we examine the influence of infrastructure, institutional quality, colo-
nial and geographic context, and trade preferences on the pattern of bilateral trade. We
match bilateral trade and tariff data and control for tariff preferences, country size, and
standard trade cost measures, and find that infrastructure, and institutional quality, are
significant determinants of export levels. Our contributions relative to the literature re-
viewed above include the following. We work with a Poisson estimator, allowing us to look
not only at country-pairs where trade takes place, but also at those cases where country-
pairs do not actually trade. By using a Poisson estimator, we address recent concern in
the gravity literature about the robustness of selection-based gravity models.1 We take
account of multilateral resistance by employing the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) method
on our sample. We also mix principal components (to condense our institutional and
infrastructure measures into broad measures) with more detailed analysis of institutional
indicators. Using a first stage Probit regression we also control both for firm heterogeneity
and selection in the second stage Poisson regressions. 2
Working with a gravity model applied to a relatively extensive global panel of bi-
1Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have shown that the Poisson performs best, and is more robust to specifi-
cation errors. It is also consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
2Recent related work involving thresholds, zeros in bilateral trade, and trade growth along extensive
and intensive margins in a gravity context, includes Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Hummels and Klenow
(2005), Evenett and Venables (2002), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), and Felbermayr and Kohler
(2004).
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lateral trade flows (compared to the literature reviewed above), we provide a breakdown
of the estimated overall impact of institutional and infrastructure variables in our sample
on trade flows between various country cohorts. Our results predict that around sample
means, differences in institution and infrastructure quality alone imply trade volumes be-
tween low income countries (South-South trade) being roughly 74% below trade volumes
between high income countries (North-North trade). They imply trade between low and
high income countries (North-South trade) roughly 55% to 64% below North-North trade.
In the case of South-South trade, it is a combination of low institutional and infrastructure
quality on both the importer and exporter side that leads to this result. While we em-
phasize exports of developing countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in the
South also effectively limits market access for exports from the North to low-income mar-
kets. For high income countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in destination
markets in the South implies exports 44% below North-North volumes in the case of low-
income destination markets, and 28% below in the case of middle-income countries. These
results support the notion that trade volumes in general, and the propensity of low income
countries in particular to take part in the trading system at all, depends on institutional
quality and access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our dataset and the basic
estimating framework. Results are discussed in Section 3, robustness checks or the results
are presented in Section 4 and conclusions offered in Section 5.
2 Data and Estimating Equation
Our estimation strategy follows the recent gravity-model based literature. There are
many paths that lead to the now standard functional relationship we use here. The first
to propose a gravity equation for trade flows as an empirical specification for trade without
theory was Tinbergen (1962). Anderson (1979) was the first to provide microfoundations
based on the Armington assumption. Among the more recent literature, Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) elaborate on Anderson (1979) adding a practical way to estimate
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the gravity equation structurally.3 A basic point of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
is multilateral resistance. Not accounting for multilateral resistance terms in a gravity
model can lead to biased parameter estimates. This can be addressed with country-level
fixed effects, but one then loses scope for analysis of country-level factors. To get around
this, a recent strategy involves Taylor approximations of the multilateral resistance terms
to solve for the multilateral resistance terms (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). This allows
for estimation of the gravity equation, inclusive of country-level variables. In this paper
we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009), extended to include indexes of infrastructure
and institutional quality influencing trade costs. Furthermore, we also account for firm
heterogeneity and selection which was highlighted by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) to lead to potentially significant bias if not accounted for.
2.1 Data
We work with a panel of bilateral trade, trade policy, geographic characteristics, and
income data. Given that the data for institutional quality is only available for 1990,
1995, 2000, 2001,2002, and 2003, we limit our panel data to these years. Our trade
and tariff data were obtained from the UN/World Bank WITS system (World Integrated
Trade Solution). The data in WITS come, primarily, from the UNCTAD TRAINS and
COMTRADE systems and the World Trade Organization’s integrated tariff database
(IDB). The countries included in the sample are listed in the annex (Table A.1). There
are several country combinations for which trade is not reported. Following the recent
literature, we assume that these missing observations from the database represent zero
trade. (See Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008, Baldwin and Harrigan 2007, Coe et al
2007, Felbermayr and Kohler 2004, Silva and Tenreyro 2006. Also see Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein 2008 for theoretical motivation.) However, to eliminate those observations
which are likely to be missing and not zero, we assume that if a country did not report
any imports for a particular year its trade flows are missing.4 (this procedure is often
3Other important contributions to the gravity literature include Evenett and Keller (2002), Deardorff
(1988), Chaney (2008).
4For our final dataset this represented about 10 percent of the observations.
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used, see for example Gaulier and Zignago 2010). In our final dataset about 20 percent
of bilateral trade flows are zeros. We use import data as it is likely to be more reliable
than export data since imports constitute a tax base and governments have an incentive
to track import data. Income data are taken from the World Development Indicators
database. Geographic data, together with dummies for same language and colonial links,
are taken from Clair et al (2004).5 The distance data are calculated following the great
circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the relevant capital cities.
We are ultimately interested in the dual role of institutions and infrastructure. Our
data include indexes produced by the World Bank on infrastructure, and by the Fraser
Institute for institutions. The institution indexes are from the ”Economic Freedom of the
World” (EFW) database.6 The EFW indexes are supplemented with robustness checks
(with shorter panels) using data from Transparency International and Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi (2005). The EFW indexes are themselves based on several sub-indexes
designed to measure the degree of ’economic freedom’ in five areas: (1) size of govern-
ment: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; (2) legal structure and protection of property
rights; (3) access to sound money: inflation rate, possibility to own foreign currency bank
accounts; (4) freedom to trade internationally: taxes on international trade, regulatory
trade barriers, capital market controls, difference between official exchange rate and black
market rate, etc.; and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. Each index ranges
from 0 to 10 reflecting the distribution of the underlying data. Notionally, a low value is
bad, and a higher value is good. We work with indexes for the years 1990, 1995, 2000,
2001, 2002, and 2003.
To measure infrastructure, we have taken data from the World Development Indica-
tors database. This includes data on the percentage of paved roads out of total roads, on
the total network of roads weighted with the country’s size, on the number of fixed and
mobile telephone subscribers (per 1,000 people), on the number of telephone mainlines
(per 1,000 people), on telephone mainlines in largest city (per 1,000 people), telephone
mainlines per employee, mobile phones (per 1,000 people), and freight of air transport
5http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
6http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html#efw
7
(million tons per km).
2.2 Construction of infrastructure and institution indexes
Since both sets of indexes measuring institutional and infrastructure quality are highly
correlated, we use principal component analysis to produce a set of summary indexes 7.
Principal component analysis is a useful statistical technique that has been widely applied
in fields such as face recognition and image compression, and is a common technique for
finding patterns in data of high dimension. Ideally, principal component analysis identifies
patterns in the data and based on these patterns it reduces the number of dimensions of the
data without a lot of loss of information. It reduces the data to a few principal components
by using the variance structure of the matrix of data through linear combination of the
variables.
From the results of the principal component analysis in Table 1 to Table 4, we take
the first two components to produce four indexes for the exporter country and four indexes
for the importer country; two institutional indexes, and two infrastructure indexes. These
reflect between 73 percent and 77 percent of variation in the sample (indicated by the
cumulative proportion in the tables). The tables below present the weighting factors for
each index, separately for the indexes measuring institutions and the indexes measuring
infrastructure for both the exporter and the importer countries. The tables also present
the eigenvalues for the first two components retained which is the variance of the factor.
Furthermore, the uniqueness of each variable is also shown in the tables. The uniqueness
of a given variable provides the proportion of the common variance of the variable not
associated with the factors (thus if uniqueness is equal to 1 it indicates communality).
Based on the weighting factors reported in Table 1 and Table 3, we interpret the first
infrastructure component as measuring mostly communications, and the second compo-
nent mainly physical infrastructure (air transport and roads). For the institution indexes
7As a robustness check we have also tried factor analysis which did not lead to any significantly
different results. Nevertheless our preferred method is to use principal components since this method
allows us to apply a purely mathematical transformation without taking into account any priors about
the underlying data structure. In factor analysis, on the other hand there is a structured model and some
assumptions.
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presented in Table 2 and Table 4, the index measuring the size of the government (or in
other words the government involvement in the economy) is the main determinant of the
second component while not influencing the first components both for the exporter and
importer countries. Thus we interpret the first institutional component as measuring gen-
eral correspondence with the market-oriented legal and institutional orientation flagged
by the Fraser indexes. While we interpret the second institutional component as mea-
suring less interventionist systems with lower level of state involvement in the economy
(deviations toward the Anglo-US social model).
2.3 Estimating equation
When examining the global pattern of bilateral trade flows, one striking feature of the
landscape is that many country pairs do not trade. In our initial sample 42% of importer-
exporter pairings had zero bilateral trade.8 In our analysis we also include zero flows.
In order to accommodate zero trade flows, we employ a Poisson Maximum Likelihood
estimator. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) shows that the Poisson performs best,and is most
robust to specification errors. Besides being able to include zero values of trade in our
estimations, the Poisson estimator is also consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity
(see Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
The empirical literature on institutions and economic performance has a well recog-
nized and extensively discussed problem with the endogeneity of the variables of interest.
(See Eicher and Leukert 2009). For example, institutional quality may also be driven
by trade and integration, rather than the other way around. Similarly, countries that
enjoy relatively good market access conditions might respond by improving their infras-
tructure as a result of trading, because the benefits are greater. Although the causality is
likely to go both ways, the evidence suggests that better infrastructural quality, such as
better roads, better communication possibilities, and better quality of institutions, such
as improved legal and regulatory frameworks, are more likely to have a more direct and
immediate effect on the probability of trading and the amount traded then the other
8In our final sample, given that indexes used for institutional quality are not available for several
countries, particularly those that trade less, the share is only about 20 percent.
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way around. Increased economic integration resulting from increased trade might have a
positive effect on institutional quality and infrastructure but this link is likely to be less
direct and slower to be realized. Different strategies have been followed in the literature
to handle the problem of endogeneity. While none are fully satisfactory, the fact that
the different approaches yield broadly similar results is reassuring. One workaround has
been to instrument institutional quality and infrastructure. For example, institutional
quality has been instrumented by settler mortality (see for example Acemoglu et al 2001
or Rodrik et al 2004), by the fraction of population speaking English, and by the frac-
tion of population speaking a major European language (for example Dollar and Kraay
2002, and Alcala and Ciccone 2001). Unfortunately, there are problems with each of the
instruments in our case. We work here with a sample that includes not only some former
colonies, but also developed countries that were not part of the same colonial experience.
As such, using these instruments simply is not appropriate. It is also very hard to find
suitable instruments for infrastructure quality, especially if you are interested in estimated
effects from actual variations in infrastructure itself. For example, Ioannides et al (2008)
instrument the number of telephones with the degree of competitiveness of the telecom-
munication sector. We define institutional quality in a wide sense including regulatory
quality in our measure, and so such an approach simply would not work here. To address
these potential problems we have done the following. We have first used a method simi-
lar to approaches followed by Donaldson (2010), Caldero´n and Serve´n (2010), Stone and
Bania (2009), Mollick et al (2006), and Zhang and Fan (2004). This involved combining
various measures of institutional and infrastructure quality from the World Bank and the
Fraser Institute through principle components. Then, instead of using the current values
of the principal components, we use their lagged values to reduce the potential bias arising
from the possible inverse causality (Arellano and Bond, 1991). For a robustness check,
we also report results where we use alternative composite measures from Transparency
International and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) (though with shorter panels).
This allows for some cross-checking on the different indexes used in this paper. The basic
results remain the same using these alternative measures.
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We start with the basic estimating equation, as specified in equation (1). Equation
(1) is relatively general, and is used in much of the current literature as discussed below.
From the gravity literature, we expect trade flows to be a function of importer and exporter
income, as well as of determinants of bilateral trade costs like distance and tariffs. We also
include variables of interest for the present exercise. These are measures of infrastructure
and institutional aspects of exporters that we expect to impact on trading costs.
lnMi,j,t = α0 + α1 ln GDPj,t + α2 ln GDPi,t + α3 lnTi,j,t +
α4 ln disti,j + α5comlang ethnoi,j + α6colonyi,j +
+α7 ln INF1j,t + α8 ln INS1j,t + α9 ln INF2j,t + α10 ln INS2j,t
+α11 ln INF1i,t + α12 ln INS1i,t + α13 ln INF2i,t + α14 ln INS2i,t + u
(1)
Our right-hand side variables are summarized in Table 5. Mi,j,t is country i imports
from country j at time t. As a proxy for market potential, GDP is included for exporter
(j) and importer (i) countries. These are standard gravity variables, as is distance dist and
tariffs T . For bilateral import protection, we use applied tariffs, lnTi,j,t = ln (1 + τi,j,t).
τi,j,t indicates the applied tariff rate offered by importer i to exporter j in period t.
Distance is well established in the gravity equation literature. (See for example Disidier
and Head 2008, and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003.) To capture historical and cultural
linkages between trading partners several zero-one type dummy variables are included in
the estimating equation. The variable colony takes the value of 1 if the exporting country
j was a colony of the partner country i. Finally, a separate dummy, comlang ethno
captures if the traders of the two partner countries can speak the same language, or
generally share the same linguistic heritage. Institutional and infrastructure quality for
both the importer (i) and exporter (j) is measured by INS1, INS2, and INFR1, INF2
respectively. These are indexes obtained after principal component analysis, as discussed
above. In all the regressions the lagged value of these indexes are used.
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In order to include multilateral resistance terms, equation (1) is extended following
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Indexing importers by (i, k, h), and exporters by (j,m, z),
equations (19) and (20) on page 80 of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) are reproduced as
equations (2) and (3) below.
Pit =
∑
m/∈i
lnTimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
− (0.5)
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnThzt (2)
Pjt =
∑
j /∈j
lnTkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
− (0.5)
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnThzt (3)
Here, we have modified the basic Baier and Bergstrand specification to include time
indexing. In the case of tariffs lnTijt, we can specify multilateral resistance as in equation
(4) below.
MRTijt = Pit+Pjt =
∑
m/∈i
lnTimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
∑
k/∈j
lnTkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPmt
GDPzt
lnThzt
(4)
We can easily extend equation (4) to the more general case of bilateral time varying
variables Gijt as in equation (5) and importer and exporter multilateral resistance terms
for institution and infrastructure indexes for exporters Iexport:jt and importers Iimport:it as
in equations (6) and (7).
MRGijt =
∑
m/∈i
lnGimt
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
∑
k/∈j
lnGkjt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
N∑
h=1
N∑
z=1
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPmt
GDPzt
lnGhzt (5)
MRimport:ijt = lnIit
N∑
m/∈i
GDPmt
GDPwt
+
N∑
k/∈j
lnIkt
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnIht (6)
MRexport:ijt =
N∑
m/∈i
lnImt
GDPmt
GDPwt
+ lnIjt
N∑
k/∈j
GDPkt
GDPwt
−
∑
h
∑
z
GDPht
GDPwt
GDPzt
GDPwt
lnIzt (7)
Our estimating equation augmented by the controls for multilateral resistance for
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all the variables proxying for transport costs:
lnMi,j,t = α0 + α1 ln GDPj,t + α2 ln GDPi,t + α3 lnTi,j,t +
α4 ln disti,j + α5comlang ethnoi,j + α6colonyi,j +
+α7 ln INF1j,t + α8 ln INS1j,t + α9 ln INF2j,t + α10 ln INS2j,t
+α11 ln INF1i,t + α12 ln INS1i,t + α13 ln INF2i,t + α14 ln INS2i,t
+α15MRTi,j,t + α16MRdisti,j,t + α17MRcomlangi,j,t + α18MRcolonyi,j,t
α19 lnMRINF1export:ijt + α20 lnMRINS1export:ijt + α21 lnMRINF2export:ijt +
α22 lnMRINS2export:ijt + α23 lnMRINF1import:ijt + α24 lnMRINS1import:ijt +
α25 lnMRINF2import:ijt + α26 lnMRINS2import:ijt + u
(8)
where MRTi,j,t,MRdisti,j,t, MRcomlangi,j,t, and MRcolonyi,j,t have been constructed
following (5),MRINF1export:ijt, MRINF2export:ijt, MRINST1export:ijt, MRIST2export:ijt,
have been constructed (7), and MRINF1import:ijt, MRINF1import:ijt, MRINF1import:ijt,
MRINF1import:ijt, have been constructed following (6). Also, following Baier and Bergstrand,
we impose constraints linking direct terms to MR terms in the estimating equation.9
Following Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) (and more recently Egger et al
(2011)) we also run a specification where we control for selection and firm heterogeneity.
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) show that not accounting for firm heterogeneity
can lead to biased results. On the other hand, Egger et al (2011) using also a Poisson
model in the second stage, find that not accounting for the presence of heterogeneous firms
appears less relevant than not accounting for zeros. Here we account both for zeros and
firm heterogeneity in our regression. This involves running a first stage Probit regression
and then using the terms obtained from the Probit to control for both firm heterogeneity
and selection in our main Poisson equation 10.
9α1 = 1, α2 = 1, α3 = α15, α4=α16, α5=α17, α6=α18, α7=α19, α8=α20, α9=α21, α10=α22, α11=α23,
α12=α24, α13=α25, α14=α26.
10See detailed discussion about the derivation of the methodology in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008). Similarly to Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) we report robust standard errors but we do
not correct for the generated regressors in the second stage.
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Thus first a Probit regression is run from which, following Egger et al (2011) and
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), we obtain the inverse Mills ratio ( λi,j,t) to
correct for the nonrandom prevalence of zero trade flows in the second stage. In addition,
to control for potential unobserved firm level heterogeneity, similarly to Egger et al
(2011), we use higher order polynomial controls (η2i,j,t, η
3
i,j,t, η
4
i,j,t) which are based on
the linear predictions in the Probit model. Egger et al (2011) show that including
higher order polynomials up to up to a fourth order (excluding the linear term for reasons
of collinearity) has the added advantage that the polynomial control function captures
possible nonlinearities due to the firm extensive margin. Such additional nonlinearities
are present if firms are in fact heterogenous.
We have estimated equation (9) for the first stage Probit regression. Since the
Probit regression is used mainly to be able to eliminate the potential bias arising from not
controlling for firm heterogeneity and selection, we do not include our main variables of
interest, infrastructure and institution quality, in the Probit regression. Instead, in order
to reduce the potential omitted variable bias and thus to obtain better correction terms,
we include exporter (νj), importer (ζi), and time dummies (θt) in the Probit regression.
This also implies that in the Probit regression we have a different set of explanatory
variables than in the second stage Poisson regressions eliminating the problem of potential
multicollinearity.
lnMi,j,t = α0 + α1 ln GDPj,t + α2 ln GDPi,t + α3 lnTi,j,t +
α4 ln disti,j + α5comlang ethnoi,j + α6colonyi,j + α7λi,j,t +
α8η
2
i,j,t + α9η
3
i,j,t + α10η
4
i,j,t + ζi + νj + θt + εijt
(9)
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3 Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 6. The first three columns present results based
on a Poisson estimator and including yearly fixed effects and multilateral resistance terms
for all trade cost variables including the institution and infrastructure indexes. Constraints
were applied as specified in equation (8), namely we constrained the GDP coefficients
to be equal to 1, and all the trade cost variables to be equal to their corresponding
multilateral resistance terms. The first two columns present regression results without
controlling for firm heterogeneity and selection bias using the correction terms from the
Probit estimation, while the third column include those terms. The last column of the
table presents the Probit estimation which was used to obtain the correction terms.
Looking at the results of the regressions in the first three columns, distance has
the expected sign and magnitude. When correcting for firm heterogeneity and selection
(column 3), the coefficients of distance are slightly higher. This is similar for tariffs,
although the significance of the variable becomes somewhat lower in column 3. The results
indicate that for the exporters, both the quality of the infrastructure and institutions
matter, although the first institutional index is not significant. When controlling for
firm heterogeneity and selection, both infrastructure indexes has a high, positive and
significant coefficient, indicating that both physical and communication infrastructure
in the exporting country have an important significant effect on export performance.
For institutions, more market oriented institutional systems in the exporting country
foster export performance. On the importer side, similarly market oriented institutions
have a positive significant impact on trade. Furthermore, both better quality of physical
and communication infrastructure of the importing country have a positive significant
impact on imports. The coefficients of the principal components measuring quality of the
importing country’s institutional and infrastructure quality are lower than the coefficients
of the principal components measuring the quality of institutions and infrastructure in
the exporting country. Thus our results highlight the importance of both institutions
and infrastructure for trade performance. Furthermore, the results also indicate, that
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the quality of institutions and infrastructure in the exporting country matters slightly
more for the export performance than the quality of institutions and infrastructure of the
importing country although both are important. Controlling for firm heterogeneity and
selection does not change the results for most of the coefficients, although the test of joint
significance of the the correction terms indicate their significance.
If we move from statistical significance to economic relevance, what do our coefficient
estimates tell us? In order to better understand what our results mean for countries at
different income levels, we have also calculated predicted relative bilateral trade flows at
group means. We have benchmarked the calculations to the high income countries, and
compared middle and low income countries to this benchmark. This is presented in Table
7. These figures show us by how much trade is lower between the different country pairs
due to their lower quality of infrastructure and institution.11
Our results predict that around sample means, differences in institution and infras-
tructure quality alone imply trade volumes between low income countries (South-South
trade) being roughly 26% of what their trade volumes would be if the quality of their in-
stitutions and infrastructure would be the same as high income countries’. Trade between
low and high income countries (North-South trade) are also much lower than what could
be achieved by having better institutions and infrastucture. When low income countries
are exporting to middle income countries, trade flows are 55% below the level of high
income countries’ trade (North-North trade). While we emphasize exports of developing
countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in the South also effectively lim-
its market access for exports from the North to low-income markets. For high income
countries, low institutional and infrastructure quality in destination markets in the South
implies exports 44% below North-North volumes in the case of low-income destination
markets, and 28% below in the case of middle-income countries. On the other hand,
when middle-income countries are exporting to low-income countries, their trade will be
about 70% lower than that of trade between high-income countries. These results support
the notion that trade volumes in general, and the propensity of low income countries in
11The calculations were based on using the average principal components by income groups and the
coefficient results presented in column 3 of Table 6
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particular to take part in the trading system at all, depends on institutional quality and
access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure.
4 Robustness
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also report the regressions using other
institutional variables from alternative sources in Table 8. These measures are generally
available for a somewhat shorter time span than our primary indicators. Instead of us-
ing principal component analysis, as a further robustness check, we have included these
institutional variables separately in the regressions.
Alternative variables measuring institutional quality were obtained from two sources.
A proxy for the level of corruption was obtained from the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index. The Index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which
corruption is perceived to exist, defining corruption in the public sector as the abuse of
public office for private gain.
Several other variables measuring the quality of institutions and governance were
taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The authors estimate six dimensions
of governance covering 209 countries and territories for five time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2004. The following variables were available in the dataset: government effec-
tiveness (measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service
delivery), political stability (measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in,
government, including terrorism), regulatory quality (measuring the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies), rule of law (measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence), voice and accountability
(measuring political, civil and human rights). The six indicators are measured in units
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance. To be
able to take the logarithm of these variables, we rescaled them, with the new index values
starting from 1.
The results using the variables measuring different aspects of institutional quality
and the index proxying the importance of corruption in the public sector reinforce the
17
findings in the Section 3. All the variables proxying institutional quality have a positive
and significant sign. The indexes are included both for the importer and exporter country.
The coefficient of the indexes are consistently higher for the exporter than for the the
importer, although both have a positive impact on trade. This seems to imply that
although both the importer and the exporter country’s institutional quality matters for
the success of exporting and the amount of exporting, it is the exporter’s institutions which
will have a somewhat bigger impact. Thus better institutional quality in the exporting
country has a crucial role for the country’s export performance.
The sample varies slightly for the different indexes as these variables were available
for a slightly different set of countries. The sample is the smallest for the first variable
which proxies corruption (the variable comes from the Transparency International) for
which results are presented in the first column in Table 8. The coefficients are some-
what more comparable throughout the rest of the columns which present results using
variables obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). Corruption and ’voice
and accountability’ seem to have a somewhat lower positive impact on trade flows than
the effectiveness of the government, political stability, regulatory quality, or rule of low.
Nevertheless, all indexes have a positive significant impact on exports and thus our results
confirm and highlight the importance of institutional quality for trade performance.
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we have worked with a panel of bilateral trade flows to explore the in-
fluence of infrastructure and institutional quality on patterns of trade. In contrast to
the recent selection-based literature, in this paper we have used a Poisson estimator ex-
tended to include the Baier and Berstrand method for multilateral resistance related to
country-specific variables. We have also used a specification where running first a Pro-
bit regression we control both for firm heterogeneity and selection in the second stage
Poisson regressions. We have found that exports depend on institutional quality and ex-
porter and importer access to well developed transport and communications infrastructure
both at home and in partner countries. Hence, though our interest has primarily been
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to emphasize determinants of the exports of developing countries, low institutional and
infrastructure quality in the South also limits market access for exports from the North.
The recent empirical literature supports the characterization of developing coun-
tries as belonging either to a cohort of countries that are deepening linkages with the
global trading system (globalizers), or to those that are not (Dollar and Kraay, 2004).
The globalizers (like China and India) have seen rapid growth in trade, and this growth
has been linked to accelerating growth rates, pushing incomes on a catch-up path with
the OECD and driving poverty rates down in the process (Sala-i-Martin, 2006). At the
same time, there is another cohort of developing countries (many in Africa) with a very
different story to tell. While trade and growth may be wrapped up in a positive cycle for
some countries, those left behind have not experienced rapid trade growth, or the related
mechanisms that signal deeper integration into the global economy. The dependence of
exports on conditions in both source and destination markets, as we find here, suggests
that regionally there can be a collective problem of clustered poor regional trade perfor-
mance when, individually, low income countries find themselves with regional partners in
the same cohort.
Our results predict that low income countries will trade about 74% below trade
volumes taking place between high income countries due to lower quality of institutions
and infrastructure. Similarly, trade between low and high income countries is roughly 55%
to 64% below that of high income countries’ trade due to differences in institutional and
infrastructure quality. As our results indicate, it is not only the quality of institutions and
infrastructure of the exporter what matters but also that of the importer . This implies
that low institutional and infrastructure quality in the South also effectively limits market
access for exports from the North to low-income markets. For high income countries, low
institutional and infrastructure quality in destination markets in the South implies exports
44% below North-North volumes in the case of low-income destination markets, and 28%
below in the case of middle-income countries. These results support the notion that trade
volumes in general, and the propensity of low income countries in particular to take part
in the trading system at all, depends on institutional quality and access to well developed
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transport and communications infrastructure.
Our results complement research on the impact of regulatory environments behind
the border on economic interaction. Indeed, this is not specific to developing countries, but
is emerging as a major focus on regional trade agreements between high income countries
as well. For example, a combination of regulatory shortfall and poor infrastructure quality
has been flagged as an important determinant of market access conditions. It points
to potential impacts on goods trade linked to market structure in both international
transport services and domestic distribution services. For example, Bradford (2005) has
analyzed the impacts of distribution margins in eight OECD countries - defined as the ratio
between the value of output in producer and consumer prices for 124 products. The focus
is on deriving an estimate of the specific distribution margins (including wholesale/retail
trade and transportation) by explicitly controlling for the impacts of trade barriers on
producer prices. His estimates range from a low of around 60 (i.e., 60 cents to move
a dollar worth of output measured at world prices) for Canada, the Netherlands, the
UK and the US to a high of almost 100 for Japan. CGE model simulations suggest
that inefficiencies in distribution reduce imports and impose substantial welfare costs, the
magnitude of which is similar to that caused by border trade barriers. Working with
regulatory data for the EU, Francois and Wooton (2010) find a similar mechanism at play
in North-South trade. Market power in the North may disproportionately limit market
access conditions for exporters from the South. Such results reinforce the basic message
that market access, and economic integration in a broad sense, is a complex function of
regulatory and institutional mechanisms at least as much as it is a function of direct trade
barriers like tariffs.
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Table 1: Principal components weighting factors, Exporter’s Infrastructure
ln INF1j,t ln INF2j,t
Exporter’s Infrastructure Component 1 Component 2 Uniqueness
Airtransport 0.2466 0.78 0.3309
Fixedmobilesubscribers 0.9617 0.1254 0.0594
Mobilephones 0.8202 0.2062 0.2848
Roadspaved 0.7735 -0.0455 0.3996
Telephonemainlines 0.9529 0.1238 0.0767
Roadstotalnetwork 0.0362 0.8707 0.2406
Eigenvalue 3.35224 1.25586
Cumulative proportion 0.5277 0.768
Table 2: Principal components weighting factors, Exporter’s Institutions
ln INS1j,t ln INS2j,t
Exporter’s Institutions Component 1 Component 2 Uniqueness
Size of government 0.0227 0.9546 0.0882
Legal system property rights 0.7974 -0.3713 0.2263
Sound money 0.7136 0.2427 0.4318
Regulation 0.81 0.2961 0.2562
Freedom to trade internationally 0.8139 -0.0364 0.3362
Eigenvalue 2.47357 1.18767
Cumulative proportion 0.4947 0.7322
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Table 3: Principal components weighting factors, Importer’s Infrastructure
ln INF1i,t ln INF2i,t
Importer’s Infrastructure Component 1 Component 2 Uniqueness
Airtransport 0.2082 0.8078 0.304
Fixedmobilesubscribers 0.9663 0.0961 0.0571
Mobilephones 0.8313 0.0306 0.3079
Roadspaved 0.7394 0.0306 0.4524
Telephonemainlines 0.9471 0.1355 0.0846
Roadstotalnetwork 0.0035 0.8628 0.2556
Eigenvalue 3.2201 1.31824
Cumulative proportion 0.5367 0.7564
Table 4: Principal components weighting factors, Importer’s Institutions
ln INS1i,t ln INS2i,t
Importer’s Institutions Component 1 Component 2 Uniqueness
Size of government 0.0343 0.9596 0.078
Legal system property rights 0.7632 -0.4429 0.2214
Sound money 0.7462 0.1487 0.4211
Regulation 0.8407 0.2078 0.2501
Freedom to trade internationally 0.8084 -0.0624 0.3426
Eigenvalue 2.50428 1.18244
Cumulative proportion 0.5009 0.7373
Table 5: Regression model variable description
ln GDPj,t log of GDP of exporter(partner)
ln GDPi,t log of GDP of importer(reporter)
lnT log of tariff: (1+t)
ln dist the log of distance (km, great circle method)
comlang ethno shared linguistic/cultural heritage
colony reporter and partner had colonial relations
ln INF1 exporter/importer infrastructure index 1
(component 1 for exporter and importer)
ln INS1 exporter/importer institution index 1
(component 1 for exporter and importer)
ln INF2 exporter/importer infrastructure index 2
(component 2 for exporter and importer)
ln INS2 exporter/importer institution index 2
(component 2 for exporter and importer)
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Table 6: Estimated coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson, Poisson, Poisson, Probit
Non-robust s.e. Robust s.e. Robust s.e. with
Probit correction terms
lnMi,j,t lnMi,j,t lnMi,j,t Pr(lnMi,j,t > 0)
ln GDPj,t 1 1 1 -1.341
(0) (0) (0) (1.070)
ln GDPi,t 1 1 1 1.323
(0) (0) (0) (0.818)
ln dist -0.794*** -0.794*** -0.883*** -0.153***
(1.55e-05) (0.0353) (0.0257) (0.0426)
comlang ethno 0.0947*** 0.0947 0.121 0.462***
(5.49e-05) (0.118) (0.175) (0.176)
colony -0.0211*** -0.0211 -0.0347 -0.323
(5.97e-05) (0.130) (0.141) (0.141)
lnT -0.0870*** -0.0870*** -0.112* -0.0630*
(3.73e-05) (0.0336) (0.0604) (0.0363)
ln INF1j,t 0.467*** 0.467 0.874***
(0.000209) (0.407) (0.234)
ln INF2j,t 1.046*** 1.046*** 0.850***
(9.32e-05) (0.165) (0.182)
ln INS1j,t 0.0932*** 0.0932 -0.279
(0.000158) (0.225) (0.247)
ln INS2j,t 0.828*** 0.828*** 0.590***
(0.000103) (0.108) (0.158)
ln INF1i,t 0.382*** 0.382*** 0.381***
(5.41e-05) (0.0782) (0.0788)
ln INF2i,t 0.221*** 0.221** 0.289***
(2.18e-05) (0.0924) (0.0555)
ln INS1i,t 0.0353*** 0.0353 0.0532
(3.62e-05) (0.0746) (0.0465)
ln INS2i,t 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.292***
(2.51e-05) (0.0286) (0.0548)
λi,j,t 1.916
(1.304)
η2i,j,t 23.53
(15.85)
η3i,j,t -31.53
(27.71)
η4i,j,t 11.76
(13.54)
Observations 12,097 12,097 9,020 9,020
PseudoR2 0.5824
χ2, P r > χ2 380.92 (0.00) 4740.49 (0.00)
χ2, P r > χ2II 39.16(0.0000)
χ2, P r > χ2III 23.58 (0.0001)
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Poisson regressions with time fixed effects, and multilateral resistance terms.
Probit regression with exporter, importer and time fixed effects.
The sample size is smaller due to some outcomes being perfectly predicted.
χ2, P r > χ2II refer to a test of joint significance of λi,j,t, η
2
i,j,t,η
3
i,j,t, η
4
i,j,t
χ2, P r > χ2III refer to a test of joint significance of η2i,j,t,η
3
i,j,t, η
4
i,j,t
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Table 7: Relative Bilateral Flows, evaluated at group means high:high=100
importer
high income middle income low income
exporter
high income 100 72.48 55.82
middle income 55.09 39.93 30.75
low income 46.21 33.50 25.80
note: basis is sample average difference for infrastructure and institutions
Table 8: Estimated coefficients with alternative institutional measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
control of government political regulatory rule voice and
corruption corruption effectiveness stability quality of law accountability
ln r GDP 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln p GDP 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln dist -0.571*** -0.590*** -0.601*** -0.561*** -0.590*** -0.594*** -0.571***
(0.0256) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0327) (0.0307) (0.0299) (0.0330)
lnT -0.365*** -0.338*** -0.234*** -0.551*** -0.358*** -0.307*** -0.715***
(0.0854) (0.0737) (0.0726) (0.0929) (0.0813) (0.0662) (0.0948)
comlang ethno 1.082*** 1.109*** 1.075*** 1.217*** 1.037*** 1.119*** 1.153***
(0.104) (0.106) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.106) (0.105)
colony -0.146 -0.144 -0.187* -0.110 -0.128 -0.156 -0.109
(0.0983) (0.103) (0.103) (0.107) (0.104) (0.101) (0.105)
ln p corruptionm 0.360***
(0.135)
ln r corruption 0.314***
(0.0328)
ln p controlofcorruption 0.699***
(0.100)
ln r controlofcorruption 0.446***
(0.0361)
ln p govteffectiveness 0.834***
(0.0996)
ln r govteffectiveness 0.631***
(0.0366)
ln p politicalstability 0.879***
(0.136)
ln r politicalstability 0.333***
(0.0505)
ln p regulatoryquality 0.880***
(0.124)
ln r regulatoryquality 0.607***
(0.0576)
ln p ruleoflaw 0.847***
(0.106)
ln r ruleoflaw 0.519***
(0.0444)
ln p voiceandaccountability 0.624***
(0.137)
ln r voiceandaccountability 0.0933*
(0.0535)
Constant 11.60*** 11.36*** 11.30*** 11.42*** 11.31*** 11.33*** 11.42***
(0.0782) (0.0805) (0.0801) (0.0840) (0.0847) (0.0811) (0.0842)
Observations 19,507 45,943 47,446 43,423 47,658 47,192 48,385
χ2 742.99 868.63 1123.99 756.01 877.02 904.00 589.39
Pr > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions include multilateral resistance terms for all trade cost variables and annual fixed effects.
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Annex Table A.1: Sample countries
reporter & partner
Albania Guyana Panama
Algeria Honduras Papua New Guinea
Argentina Hungary Paraguay
Australia Iceland Peru
Austria India Philippines
Bahamas, The Indonesia Poland
Bangladesh Iran, Islamic Rep. Portugal
Barbados Ireland Romania
Belgium Israel Russian Federation
Belgium-Luxembourg Italy Rwanda
Benin Jamaica Senegal
Bolivia Japan Singapore
Botswana Jordan Slovak Republic
Brazil Kenya Slovenia
Bulgaria Korea, Rep. South Africa
Cameroon Kuwait Spain
Central African Republic Latvia Sri Lanka
Chad Lithuania Sweden
Chile Macedonia, FYR Syrian Arab Republic
Colombia Madagascar Ghana
Congo, Rep. Malawi Tanzania
Costa Rica Malaysia Thailand
Cote d’Ivoire Mali Togo
Croatia Malta Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Mauritius Tunisia
Czech Republic Mexico Turkey
Dominican Republic Morocco Uganda
Ecuador Mozambique Ukraine
Egypt, Arab Rep. Namibia United States
El Salvador Nepal Uruguay
Estonia New Zealand Venezuela
Finland Germany
Guinea-Bissau Greece
partner only
Fiji Sierra Leone United Arab Emirates
Haiti
reporter only
Angola Djibouti Netherlands
Antigua and Barbuda Dominica Saudi Arabia
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Seychelles
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Solomon Islands
Bahrain France St. Kitts and Nevis
Belarus Grenada St. Lucia
Belize Hong Kong, China St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bhutan Kazakhstan Sudan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Kyrgyz Republic Suriname
Burkina Faso Lao PDR Swaziland
Burundi Lebanon Tajikistan
Cambodia Lesotho Turkmenistan
Canada Luxembourg United Kingdom
China Maldives Uzbekistan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mauritania Vanuatu
Denmark Moldova Yemen
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